The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Corporate Bond Ratings by Chang, Qi









The John Molson School of Business 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science in Administration (Finance) at 
Concordia University 





© Qi Chang, 2015 
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:                   Qi Chang 
 
Entitled:              The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Corporate Bond Ratings 
 
and submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ADMINISTRATION (FINANCE) 
complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards with 
respect to originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final Examining Committee: 
                       Satyaveer S. Chauhan         Chair 
Nilanjan Basu              Examiner 
Rahul Ravi                 Examiner 
Harjeet S. Bhabra           Supervisor 
 
Approved by__________________________________________________________ 
Graduate Program Director 
_____________2015_______________________________________________________ 










       We examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on a firm's bond ratings using a large 
sample of U.S. firms between 1990 and 2012 that experienced a rating change.  For both the 
upgrade and downgrade samples, we investigate the acquisitions undertaken by these firms within 
three years and five years before the rating change. We find that firms with positive announcement 
period abnormal returns around the acquisition preceding the rating change are more likely to 
experience a rating upgrade, whereas firms with a rating downgrade had abnormal returns around 
acquisitions that were more negative. Before the bond rating change, the upgraded firms make 
better acquisitions compared to downgraded firms; however downgraded firms make fewer but 
higher quality acquisitions in the post rating change period.  We further employ the Berkovitch 
and Narayanan (1993) methodology to distinguish between the synergy, agency and hubris motives 
for acquisitions. We determine that for rating upgrades, the acquisitions are mostly motivated by 
synergy in the years prior to the upgrade announcement.  For rating downgrades, there is some 
evidence to suggest that the acquisition motive is either agency or hubris prior to the downgrade 
announcement.  However, in the post rating period, our evidence suggests that value creation 
through synergy is an important motive for acquisitions in subsequent years for both, upgraded and 
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Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are the three primary bond rating agencies that 
produce manuals of statistics associated with bonds and stocks and bond ratings, and also provide 
information to financial markets. The creditworthiness of most issuers along with their obligations 
is not steady and fixed over an extended period of time.  Bond rating changes reveal the variations 
in the inherent position of issuers as well as their obligations.  The rating revisions should convey 
significant valuable information since rating agencies use the through-the-cycle methodology. 
According to Moody’s, the through-the-cycle rating methods are constant since they are intended 
to analyze default risk across long investment horizons and are typically changed only after rating 
agencies are confident that the riskiness changes in the firms’ profile are likely to be more than just 
transitory (Altman and Rijken, 2004). Previous studies find that rating revisions have an 
ambiguous effect on providing new information to the financial markets.  Pinches and Singleton 
(1978) suggest that rating changes carry comparatively little information. However, subsequent 
studies robustly find that bond rating downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns, 
while bond rating upgrades appear to be nonevents (Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Hsueh and Liu (1992), Dichev and Piotroski (2001), Anderson, Bhabra, Bhabra 
and Lamba (2011)). Changes in ratings reflect the changed circumstances for a firm to meet its 
fixed obligations. Recent research suggests that ratings changes follow permanent changes in a 
firm's cash flow situation and are not necessarily signals of future earnings. These cash flow 
changes are impacted by the long-term investment decisions undertaken by the firm. 
 
While the level of a firm's capital investments can be observed by looking at the capital 
expenditures made over the years, it is difficult to assess the quality of projects undertaken since 
actual project investments are not observable.  Mergers and acquisitions undertaken by a firm, on 
the other hand, are both long-term investments and provide us with unique insights into the quality 
of investments made by managers. In an efficient market, the stock market's response to an 
acquisition decision provides an objective assessment of whether the investment is value creating 
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or not.  In this study, we analyze if rating revisions are related to the mergers and acquisitions 
undertaken by the firm in the years preceding the rating revision.  We hypothesize that 
acquisitions that are value creating improve the firm's ability to meet its fixed obligations and thus 
lowers the risk for lenders.  These firms are likely to experience an upward revision in their credit 
rating.  On the other hand, acquisitions that result in no change in firm value or adversely affect 
firm value increases the risk for lenders and will likely lead to a downward revision in rating. We 
also examine the acquisitions after the rating change to determine if firm's make adjustments to 
their investment strategy, particularly following a downgrade.   
 
Our sample consists of 3295 announcements of U.S rating changes from Moody’s from 1990 to 
2012.  We limit our sample to companies which had no other rating change announcement in the 3 
years preceding the rating revision included in the sample. The announcement year of the rating 
adjustments is defined as Year 0.  Relative to Year 0, we collect all mergers and acquisitions from 
three years and five years before and after the announcement year, listed on SDC (Securities Data 
Corporation’s U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database).  Our M&A sample covers the period 
1985 to 2013. 
 
We find the abnormal returns for downgrade firms surrounding the bond rating change are 
significantly negative, largely because the downgrade firms either offer significant information to 
capital markets or impose costs on the affected firms in the pre-rating change period.  Some 
evidence for upgrade firms shows the abnormal returns to be generally positive.  Upgrade firms 
with acquisitions announced in the pre-rating change period have better abnormal returns than 
upgrade non-acquirer companies, which imply that investors recognize the improving financial 
position of companies well through acquisitions before rating changes are acknowledged by the 
market.  Before the bond rating change, acquirers that experience positive abnormal return 
acquisitions are more likely to get upgrade.  Firms with acquisitions accompanied by negative 
abnormal returns prior to the rating change are more likely to experience a rating downgrade.  
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However, in the subsequent years, the downgrade companies appear to apply remedial measures on 
their long-term investment activities and make fewer but higher quality acquisitions compared to 
upgrade companies. 
 
Our results strongly suggest that the quality of acquisitions in the period preceding the rating 
revision are significantly related to the direction of the rating revision.  Acquirers that experience 
positive abnormal returns, positive stock price run up, higher free cash flow and better operating 
income growth, acquisitions by firms with low Tobin's q and low leverage, and acquirers that make 
non-diversifying and smaller relative deal size acquisitions are more likely to have a rating upgrade.  
Extant research suggests that acquirers tend to pay with shares (possibly overvalued) as a hedge in 
deals that are deemed more risky.  One possible explanation for our result on the method of 
payment could be that by paying for the target in shares, the firm preserves valuable cash flow and 
thus lowers the underlying risk for the lender.  
 
Employing the Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology, we also examine the motives in the 
acquisitions.  Synergy or value-enhancing acquisition should reduce the risk for lenders whereas 
agency or hubris driven acquisitions will likely have an opposite effect.  Our findings are 
consistent with these predictions.  Before the bond rating change, synergy is the main motive in 
takeovers for firms with a rating upgrade. There is some evidence to suggest that agency and hubris 
are more prominent in acquisitions in the downgrade rating firms, although the evidence is not 
strong.  After the rating change, upgraded rating firms appear to continue to make 
value-enhancing acquisitions.  Downgraded rating firms appear to take corrective measures in 
their long-term investment decisions.  For these firms, in the post rating change period, our 
evidence suggests that synergy becomes a major motive. Overall, for rating upgrades, the 
acquisitions are mostly motivated by synergy in the years prior to the upgrade announcement, 
while for rating downgrades synergy becomes an important motive in acquisitions in the years 




This paper is organized as follows.  We exhibit the literature review and demonstrate the details of 
empirical results from prior studies in section 2.  In section 3 we present an overview of our 
hypothesis while in section 4 we introduce the bond rating change and data information analyzed in 
our sample.  Section 5 provides the methodology employed and section 6 summarizes the 
empirical results.  The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Corporate bond ratings are extensively used in the investment community as a measure for the 
credit riskiness of bonds. This information is considered very valuable since it presents the 
judgments of skilled and informed financial analysts (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979). Bond rating 
revisions are significant procedures since they alert investors to the change in the firm's risk profile. 
Several early studies focus on how rating revisions are related to operating performance changes, 
before, after and during the rating revisions. 
 
Pinches and Singleton (1978) find that bond rating changes convey relatively little information. 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) support the proposition that bond rating downgrades convey 
information to the common stockholders. For bond rating upgrades, the price adjustment was 
insignificant in the announcement month, while in the 11 preceding months, upgrades firms 
showed positive abnormal returns.  Subsequently, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) document that 
downgrade rating announcements are associated with negative abnormal returns while there is little 
evidence of abnormal returns on rating upgrade announcements.  Hsueh and Liu (1992) also find 
that rating downgrades are associated with negative abnormal return but upgrades show no 
exhibition of abnormal returns by considering the differing market anticipation of bond rating 
changes. Consistent with the prior studies, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) examined the long-run 
stock returns following the bond ratings changes and find that there are significant negative 
abnormal returns following bond rating downgrades, whereas no abnormal returns following bond 
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rating upgrades.  
 
Anderson, Bhabra, Bhabra and Lamba (2012) propose two hypothesis: the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis and the cash flow permanence hypothesis, to consider whether a rating revision is a 
precursor to firms’ future earnings performance or a response to firms’ past earning performance. 
They find that rating downgrades are related to negative abnormal stock returns, though rating 
upgrades seem to be nonevents.  For the rating downgrades, earnings decrease 2 years prior to the 
announcement year and increase in the following year of the rating downgrades.  For rating 
upgrades, earnings increase prior to the rating change year but show no subsequent change to the 
rating change. The results of their analyses provide evidence that supports both the cash flow 
signaling hypothesis and the cash flow permanence hypothesis.  Rating agencies like Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are more likely to act after the firms’ performance has 
changed. While ordinary least squares regressions show a positive relation between the rating 
change announcement period abnormal return and the earning change in the announcement year, 
there is no relation observed in subsequent years. Generally their evidence is substantially more 
supportive of the cash flow permanence hypothesis. 
 
Takeovers are an essential part of the corporate environment. There is an extensive body of 
empirical research that has examined both the short-term and long-term impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on firm performance.  Firth (1980) showed that mergers and acquisitions resulted in 
profits to both acquired firms' shareholders and acquiring firms' managers, while the losses were 
mainly suffered by the acquiring firms' shareholders.  However, the cumulative effect of 
acquisitions on both acquire and target firms is generally positive and is inferred as evidence that 
acquisitions are beneficial both to the firms concerned and to the economy generally (Halpern, 
1983).  Also, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) find consistent evidence that shareholders of 
acquiring firms suffer a significant loss of approximately 10% over the 5-year post-merger period. 
Tuch and O'Sullivan (2007) further show that in the short run, mergers and acquisitions have at best 
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an insignificant effect on shareholder wealth.  In the long run, the analysis presents 
overwhelmingly negative returns with mixed evidence from accounting performance.  Finally, a 
number of researchers examine the effect of acquisitions versus internal growth on the firm 
performance.  The most remarkable study in this area is that from Meeks (1977).  He seeks to 
examine the rate of return of acquiring firms accurately by allowing for the accounting biases that 
exist. Both the pre- and post-acquisitions productivity related to the industry average around 
acquisitions are compared in the UK-quoted acquiring firms (generally 3 years prior to the 
acquisitions, and up to as much as 7 years after if it’s available).  He finds a relatively small 
positive effect in the acquisition year, and the profitability is significantly less than in the pre- 
acquisitions period afterwards. This evidence suggests that mergers have an adverse effect on 
profitability.  However, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) focus on tender offers specifically in their 
study. They note that the post-acquisition profitability deteriorates after removing accounting 
biases, though the decline is statistically insignificant.  Other researchers in this topic either 
confirm these negative results or discover little variation in performance following acquisition 
(Cosh et al. 1984; Geroski, 1988; Hughes, 1993). 
 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) examined whether corporate governance, the market for corporate 
control particularly, affects the viability of firm acquisitions. They show that acquirers with more 
antitakeover provisions experience lower announcement-period abnormal returns. Acquirer 
characteristics (firm size, free cash flow, Tobin's q, leverage, management quality, and stock price 
run-up) and deal characteristics (target firm ownership status, methods of payment, industry 
connection of acquisitions, relative deal size and whether both the acquired and acquiring firms are 
from high tech industries) are presented as control variables in their research and are related to 
acquirer returns. 
 
The question of how mergers and acquisitions affect a firm's credit rating has remained unexplored, 
despite the fact that M&As have been found to significantly impact the long-term performance of 
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acquiring firms.  In this paper we investigate if performance changes following mergers and 
acquisitions affect a firm's bond ratings and if firms respond to these credit revisions by updating 
their acquisition strategies.  Chen (2003) is the only study we could identify who examines M&As 
for a sample of 29 Taiwanese high-tech and non-high-tech firms that experienced 73 rating changes 
and finds that lower leverage, higher return on equity and acquisitions by high-tech firms increase 
the probability of a higher credit rating.  Our study focuses on the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions on bond rating change for a large sample of U.S firms that had a bond rating change 
between 1990 and 2012.  We analyze firms with ratings changes that engage in M&As as well as 
those did not make any acquisitions.  Furthermore, we investigate if firms respond to the credit 
rating change by making adjustments to their M&A strategy.  We control for acquirer, target and 
deal characteristics identified in Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) that affect acquisition decisions. 
 
We also examine the different motives for mergers and acquisitions for upgraded and downgraded 
bond rating firms both before and after the rating change.  Three main motives have been 
proposed for takeovers in the literature: synergy, agency and hubris. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) present an intuitive method to distinguish among these three motives by looking at the 
correlation between target, acquirer and total gains around an acquisition. They conclude that the 
correlation between target gain and total gain should be positive when synergy is the dominant 
motive, negative when agency is the dominant motive, and zero when hubris is the dominant 
motive.  Hubris may be present even if the main motive for acquisitions is synergy or agency. 
 
3. Hypothesis 
Changes in corporate credit ratings reflect the ability of a firm to maintain its contractual 
obligations to lenders. This ability is affected in large measure by the long-term investment 
decisions undertaken by management.  Investments that yield positive and stable cash flows lower 
the risk for lenders while risky investments with a higher probability of a negative payoff increases 
the risk for lenders.  The performance of investment activity is a significant factor for credit 
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ratings considered by rating agencies. Mergers and acquisitions pursued by management are 
long-term strategic investments made by a firm that can be identified both in terms of the time of 
the investment as well as its long-term impact on financial performance.  M&As, thus, present a 
perfect setting to examine how long-term investments affect the credit standing for a firm.  In this 
study, we propose and test the following hypotheses. 
   
(1) A firm that makes value-enhancing acquisitions is likely to experience a rating upgrade.  
Conversely, a firm that makes a value destroying acquisition is likely to experience a rating 
downgrade. This suggests that upgrade rating changes are a response to positive performance 
following past mergers and acquisitions programs, while the downgrade rating changes are a 
negative response to previous acquisition decisions.  
(2) Firms respond to bond rating changes by adjusting their future mergers and acquisitions 
activities.  In particular, firms which experience a downgrade rating change are more likely to 
make subsequent acquisitions that enhance shareholder wealth. 
(3) For acquisitions undertaken before the bond rating change, synergy is the main motive in 
takeovers for firms with upgrade rating changes, while agency is the main motive in takeovers 
for firms with downgrade rating changes. 
(4) For acquisitions undertaken after the bond rating change, synergy is the primary motive in 
acquisitions for both, firms that had a rating upgrade or a rating downgrade. Whereas there is 
no change in the main motive for upgraded firms, the main motive for downgraded firms 
changes from agency to synergy from before the rating change to after the rating change. 
 
4. Bond ratings and data description 
Bond rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings gather and analyze 
market information and provide an assessment of corporate bond credit ratings.  They assess a 
bond issuer’s financial condition and evaluate its capability of repaying its obligations on a timely 
manner.  There is a high degree of correlation among the rating categories adopted by these three 
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agencies.  In our study, we use the bond rating changes announced from Moody’s.  There are 20 
rating symbols used by Moody's that indicate the gradations of creditworthiness from least credit 
risk to greatest credit risk: Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, 
B2, B3, Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, and with each symbol signifying a group in which the 
creditworthiness are nearly the same level.  Ratings from Aaa to Baa3 categories are considered as 
investment grade, while ratings from the Ba1 to Ca categories are considered as non-investment 
grade. 
 
We hand collect a total 3,295 announcements of U.S bond rating changes from Moody’s during 
1990 to 2012, which include 1,265 rating upgrades and 2,030 rating downgrades. Since our 
objective is to study the impact of acquisition activity on a firm's credit risk, we restrict our sample 
to events of rating changes that are not preceded by a rating change in the preceding 3 years.  
When examining the long-term impact of acquisition decisions, researchers have typically studied 
the operating and stock return performance for a period of 3 to 5 years after the transaction (for e.g., 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997).  We, therefore, assume that a 3-year window allows for sufficient time 
for an acquisition decision to impact a firm's credit rating, if any. This restriction reduces the 
sample to 2,092 announcements, which include 875 rating upgrades and 1,217 rating downgrades. 
The distribution of this sample by year is shown in Table 1. The largest number of bond rating 
change announcements occurred in 2002 (202, 9.66% of the sample).  In large part, this increase 
in the rating revisions during this period can be attributed to the aftermath of the tech bubble in 
2000 and 2001. The number of rating downgraded companies is more than the number of rating 
upgraded companies by year, which is consistent with the sample distributions observed in 
previous studies.  The largest number of rating upgrades is in 2010, whereas the largest number of 
rating downgrades is in 2002.  Most of the sample (68%) is from 2000 to 2012, largely because 
there is more data available for recent years compared to the earlier years. 
 
We define the announcement year of the bond rating change as Year 0, then match all the mergers 
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and acquisitions made by bond rating change companies from Year -5 to Year 0 listed on SDC 
(Securities Data Corporation’s U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database) from 1985 to 2013. We 
use the following criteria to retain acquisitions for further analyses: 1) the acquisitions are 
completed, 2) the acquirer firms own 100% of the target firms’ shares after the transaction, and 3) 
there is only one acquisition announcement for each company on the same date.  A total of 6,794 
acquisitions were made by our sample firms that had a bond rating change.  The distribution of 
acquisitions by year is shown in Table 3.  We also extract another subsample by restricting 
acquisitions that occurred from Year -3 to Year 0.  The total number of transactions for this time 
period is 4,408 and the distribution by year is shown in Table 2.  From Table 2 we can observe that 
downgraded firms are more active in making acquisitions compared to upgraded firms before the 
bond rating change, but turn to be less involved in acquisitions after the bond rating change. And 
there are similar results from acquisitions announced from Year -5 to Year 0 subsample, which 
indicates that firms that experienced a downgrade rating change are more cautious about making 
acquisitions afterwards.  Firms that experienced an upgrade rating change appear to be more 
involved in acquisitions subsequently.  Within 3 years (5 years) before the bond rating change, the 
large numbers of acquisitions announced by upgrade firms are in years 1995-1997 (1994-1999), 
and by downgrade firms are in years 1996-2001 (1995-2001), which is very consistent with the 
surging United States stock market in the latter half of the 1990s.  Within 3 years (5 years) after the 
bond rating change, upgraded firms generally remain active in acquisitions while downgraded 
firms reduce their acquisition activities. 
 
For the cross-sectional analyses, the annual earnings information within three (five) years before 
the rating change were acquired from COMPUSTAT (Compustat Annual Industrial and Research 
database), and market return and daily stock information were obtained from the CRSP (Center for 
Research in Security Prices database).  Acquisitions were removed from the sample if they did not 
have annual earnings information on COMPUSTAT in the announcement year, or if they did not 
have market return and daily stock information available on CRSP.  Missing data decreased the 
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number of “acquisitions made by acquirer with 3 years (5 years) before bond rating change” 
sample to 1,643 (2,566) observations. 
 
Most of the targets in these acquisitions were private firms. In our sample, there are a total 370 (492) 
public target firms within 3 years (5 years) before the bond rating change and 285 (403) public 
target firms within 3 years (5 years) after the bond rating change.  The missing information on 
annual earnings in COMPUSTAT reduced the initial sample to 146 (199) public target firms within 
3 years (5 years) before the bond rating change and 131 (188) public target firms within 3 years (5 
years) after the bond rating change. 
 
The method applied to estimate the target and total gain is obtained from Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993).  The sample is selected by these three criteria: 1) at the time of the acquisition, 
the shares of both the acquirer and target firms were traded, 2) the market value of equity for both 
acquirer and target firms is available for each of the 6 days before the event day, and 3) the daily 
stock return information is available for estimating the market model.  These constraints reduced 
the number of observations to 604 acquisitions.  The analyses are undertaken for the following 
four subsamples: 1) acquisitions announced by upgrade bond rating change companies within 5 
years before the rating change, 2) acquisitions announced by downgrade bond rating change 
companies within 5 years before the rating change, 3) acquisitions announced by upgrade bond 
rating change companies within 5 years after the rating change, 4) acquisitions announced by 
downgrade bond rating change companies within 5 years after the rating change. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Event study around bond rating and acquisitions announcement dates 
In this part, we examine the abnormal return changes for firms that had their bond rating change 
from 1990-2012 over the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-2,2), (-5,5) surrounding the bond 
rating change announcements.  Here the abnormal returns are calculated in two ways.  First, we 
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apply the standard market model to assess the model’s parameters from days -260 to -61 
(MacKinlay, 1997), where day 0 is day of the bond rating change announcement day.  The 
estimated betas in the standard market model may be biased since Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
report abnormal returns in the time period up to 300 days before bond rating changes.  To diminish 
this bias, we calculate market-adjusted abnormal returns also by using the CRSP value-weighted 
return as the market portfolio proxy. We employ the methodology suggested in Patell (1976) to 
examine the statistical significance of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different event 
windows as stated above.  These analyses are undertaken for both upgrade and downgrade firms 
for the full sample as well as the subsamples: firms that announced acquisitions before their bond 
rating change and firms that announced no acquisitions before their bond rating change. 
 
We also examine the abnormal return changes for acquisitions announced by bond rating change 
acquirers from 1985-2013 by using market model and market adjusted returns separately over the 
event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-2,2), (-5,5), where day 0 is the mergers and acquisitions 
announcement day.  The subsamples for this analysis include: 1) acquisitions made by upgrade 
and downgrade firms within 3 years before and after the bond rating change, and 2) acquisitions 
made by upgrade and downgrade firms within 5 years before and after the bond rating change. 
 
5.2 Univariate comparisons of acquirer and target firms 
We compare the mean of the following variables: relative deal size, firm size, free cash flow, 
Tobin’s q, leverage, operating income growth and stock price run-up (variables are defined in the 
appendix) of the upgrade and downgrade acquirer companies within three (five) years before the 
rating change announcements during 1985-2013, to evaluate if firm and deal characteristics are 
different before and after the rating changes for both upgrade and downgrade acquirer companies.  
Likewise, we calculate the mean of the variables, relative deal size, firm size, Tobin’s q and 
premium of public target firms within three (five) years before and after the rating change during 
1985-2013 to examine which characteristics of public target companies are associated with rating 
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upgrade and downgrade firms. 
 
5.3 Logistic regression analysis  
We estimate logistic regressions to determine if the acquisitions undertaken by our sample firms 
affect the likelihood of a positive or negative rating change.  The dependent variable is the dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if the acquirer companies have upgrade bond rating change and 0 
otherwise.  Acquisitions that create shareholder wealth through positive synergies lower the risk 
for creditors.  These firms are expected to experience a positive change in their credit ratings.  On 
the other hand, acquisitions motivated by agency and hubris are associated with shareholder wealth 
destruction and reduced cash flows in the future.  These firms are more likely to experience a 
rating down grade. 
 
Here we examine the key explanatory variable for the mergers and acquisitions announcement 
effects by using market model adjusted stock returns surrounding the acquisition announcements 
date obtained from SDC.  Market model estimates for each acquirer firms are obtained using 240 
trading days of daily return ending 200 days before the acquisition announcement date (Masulis, 
Wang and Xie, 2007).  We calculate 2-day, 3-day, 5-day and 11-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CARs) for each acquirer firm for the event windows  (-1,0), (0.+1), (-1,+1), (-2,2), (-5,5), where 
the event day 0 is the announcement date of acquisitions.  
 
We also consider deal characteristics and acquirer characteristics as control factors. The control 
variables are adapted from Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) and are defined as follows: 
a) Deal characteristics: We control target public status, Fama-French industry relatedness of the 
acquisitions, whether the acquirer and target firms are both from the high tech industry, relative 
deal size and method of payments.  We include public, private and subsidiary dummy variables to 
symbolize the target ownership status, and also use diversifying acquisition which is equal to one if 
the acquirer and target firms do not belong in the same Fama-French industry and zero otherwise. 
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We classify dummy variable high tech that equals to one if the acquirer and target firms are both 
from high-tech industries obtained from SDC and zero otherwise.  We control for the methods of 
payments by two dummy variables: All-cash deal and stock deal.  All-cash deal is the deal 
financed by pure cash and stock deal is the deal financed at least partially by stock. 
b) Acquirer characteristics: We use firm size, free cash flow (FCF), Tobin’s q, leverage, operating 
income growth, stock price run-up as control variables that are all described as acquirer 
characteristics. We evaluate firm size by using the log transformation of the total assets of 
acquirers’, and calculate the free cash flow (FCF) by using Operating Income before Depreciation 
minus Interest and Related Expense minus Income Taxes minus Capital Expenditures, scaled by 
the book value of total assets.  Tobin’s q is defined by the market value of total assets divided by 
the book value of total assets, where the market value of total assets is evaluated by the book value 
of total assets minus the book value of total equity plus the market value of total equity, scaled by 
the book value of total assets, and the market value of total equity is calculated by the number of 
shares outstanding times the stock price at the end of 11 trading days prior to the announcement 
date.  Leverage is equal to the sum of short-term debt and the long-term debt over the market value 
of total assets.  Bidder management quality is measured by industry- adjusted operating income 
growth of acquirer firms over 3 years before the acquisitions.  Finally, we examine the bidder’s 
stock price run-up by buy-and–hold abnormal return (BHAR) with a 200-day time period from 
event day -210 to -11. 
 
5.4 Assessing the Motives of Acquisitions 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) provide a simple and intuitive approach to determine acquisition 
motives by examining the relation between target gain, acquirer gain and total gain.  They define 
target and acquirer gain as the change of the shareholders’ wealth of the target and acquiring firms, 
and total gain is the sum of target and acquirer gain. The examination of the change of the 
shareholders’ wealth are established on market model prediction errors.  For each target and 
acquirer firm, the market model estimates are obtained by using 240 trading days of daily return 
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ending 200 days before the acquisition announcement date.  The CAR of each target and acquirer 
firm is computed for a 11-day window defined as five days before the acquisition announcement 
date through five days after the acquisition announcement date. 
 
The target gain is calculated by the target firms’ CAR times the market value of target firms’ 
common equity which is measured on the 6th trading day prior to the acquisition announcement 
date, minus the value of target firms’ shares held by the acquirer before the transaction.  The 
acquirer gain is calculated by the acquirer firms’ CAR times the market value of acquirer firms’ 
common equity which is measured on the 6th trading day prior to the acquisition announcement 
date.  The total gain is the sum of the target gain and acquirer gain. 
 
6. Empirical Results  
6.1 Event study results for rating change and acquisition announcements 
Table 4 shows the CARs using market model and market adjusted model in Panels A and B, 
respectively. The event days are (-1,0), (0.+1), (-1,+1), (-2,2), (-5,5) surrounding the bond rating 
change announcement.  In Panel A, which reports the results using the market model approach, 
the CARs for upgrade firms are mostly positive and insignificant around the rating change 
announcements for the full sample as well as the subsamples of firms that made acquisitions and 
those that did not.  The results for the full sample are mostly consistent with previous research.  
For downgrade firms, the CARs are negative and significant both in the full sample and the two 
subsamples, and turn to be more negative when the event window is longer. Firms that were 
downgraded and had made acquisitions in previous years are less negative compared to the firms 
that did not make any acquisitions. The smaller negative CARs for downgraded firms that made 
prior acquisitions suggests that some of the rating change announcement is most likely anticipated 
as a result of the poor acquisitions.     
 
Panel B shows the results with market adjusted CARs. The CARs for upgrade firms are positive 
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and significant around the rating change announcements for the full sample as well as the 
subsample “firms who announced acquisitions before their bond rating change”.  In the subsample 
“firms who no announced acquisitions before their bond rating change”, the significant CARs of 
0.27% and 1.37% are observed for the (0,1) and (-5,5) windows, others are all insignificantly 
positive.  Clearly, the choice of the risk adjustment model seems to impact the event study results 
due to run up prior to the rating change as noted by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986).  For 
downgrade firms, the CARs are significantly negative for the full sample and the two subsamples.  
The CARs are, likewise, more positive (negative) when the event window is longer.  Once again 
the CARs for the downgrade subsample with no M&As are more negative compared to the CARs 
for the subsample with M&As.  Our results show that the negative returns suggest the downgrade 
firms either offer significant information to capital markets or impose costs on the affected firms 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986). 
 
We present t-statistics tests across the following groups: “upgrade companies with M&A 
announcements and without M&A announcements before bond rating announcement” and 
“downgrade companies with M&A announcements and without M&A announcements before bond 
rating announcement” by using market model and market adjusted model, separately, in Panels A 
and B in Table 5.  For upgrade firms, the CARs for “companies with acquisitions announcements 
before bond rating announcements” are significantly bigger than “companies without acquisitions 
announcements before bond rating announcements” in event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-2,2) 
both in Panel A and Panel B, which indicate that investors recognize the improving financial 
position of companies well through acquisitions before rating changes are acknowledged by the 
market. 
 
We next calculate the CARs for the event windows (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,1), (-2,2) and (-5,5) 
surrounding the acquisitions announcements.  Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 present the results 
measured by market model and market adjusted model, separately. Before the bond rating change 
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(3 years before and 5 years before), the CARs of the upgrade firms are generally higher than those 
of the downgrade firms, which imply that firms which make acquisitions that are accompanied by 
positive abnormal returns are more likely to get upgraded compared to firms which make 
acquisitions with negative abnormal returns.  However, after the bond rating change (3 years after 
and 5 years after), the abnormal returns of acquisitions announced by downgrade firms are 
significantly higher, which reveal that downgrade firms make better quality acquisitions to 
improve firms’ performance and prevent the continued rating downward trend.  Additionally, we 
note that the number of firms that make acquisitions increases from before to after rating change 
period for the upgrade sample.  However, for the downgrade sample, only about 50 percent of the 
firms make acquisitions after the negative rating change.  There are two possible reasons for this. 
Downgraded firms are more cautious in long term M&A investments resulting in only a smaller 
subset making acquisitions after the rating change.  Alternately, a subset of the downgraded firms 
possibly get delisted in the ensuing years which results in a smaller number of firms that are active 
in the acquisition market.  We do not explore this issue further in this paper. 
 
6.2 Characteristics of variables for target and acquirer firms 
We compare the mean of the variables (defined in methodology section) of the upgrade and 
downgrade bond rating change acquirer companies within three (five) years before the rating 
change announcements during 1985-2013 in Table 7.  The time period in Panel A is from Year -3 
to Year 0 and in Panel B is from Year -5 to Year 0, where Year 0 is the bond rating change 
announcement year. Column 1 shows the variables Relative deal size, Firm size, FCF, Tobin’s q, 
Leverage, Operating income growth and Stock price run-up.  Columns 2 and 3 display the mean of 
the variables in the subsample of upgrade and downgrade rating acquirer firms with standard 
deviation shown in parentheses.  Columns 4 and 5 present the t-statistics and p-value for each 
variable. 
 
For the time period from Year-3 to Year 0 in panel A, the mean Tobin’s q of upgrade firms is 1.5079, 
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which is significantly smaller than the mean Tobin’s q of downgrade firms 1.6044 on 1%-level 
(p=0.0091).  This suggests that firms with higher Tobin’s q are more likely to get a rating 
downgrade, since these high growth firms take on more risk when acquiring targets and generate 
negative dollar synergies. The pre-announcement stock price run-up of the acquirers’ is also 
significantly different for the two groups.  The average of stock price run-up of upgrade firms is 
-0.0529, which is significantly higher than the average of stock price run-up of downgrade firms 
-0.1732 on 1%-level (p=0.0002). This result suggests that firms with higher buy-and-hold 
abnormal return leading up to the acquisition are likely making value maximizing acquisitions and 
have a greater possibility to get a rating upgrade.  Consistent with this result, from Year-5 to Year 0 
in panel B, we find the mean Tobin’s q of upgrade firms is 1.5167, which is significantly smaller 
than the mean Tobin’s q of downgrade firms 1.5945 on 1%-level (p=0.007). The average stock 
price run-up of upgrade firms is -0.0503, which is significantly higher than the average of stock 
price run-up of downgrade firms -0.1744 on 1%-level (p<0.0001). Furthermore, the average of 
leverage of upgrade firms is 0.0838, which is significantly less than the average of leverage of 
downgrade firms 0.0937 at 5%-level (p=0.0314).  Firms with more debts are more likely to face 
financial distress and get a rating downgrade compared with firms with less debt. It is however 
interesting to note that firms that are subsequently downgraded are high growth (Tobin's q) but 
have larger debt.  This is inconsistent with the vast body of literature on corporate capital structure 
which shows a negative relation between firm growth and leverage (Myers, 1977; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The mean of operating 
income growth of upgrade firms is 1.3325, which is marginally significantly higher than the mean 
of operating income growth of downgrade firms 1.0820 at the 10%-level (p=0.0716). This provides 
some evidence that firms with better management quality make better acquisitions for companies’ 
shareholders and reduced risk for creditors as evidenced by subsequent bond upgrades.  These two 
results are consistent with those shown in panel A from Year -3 to Year 0, although the results for 




In Table 8 we compare the mean of variables (defined in methodology section) of the public target 
firms acquired by upgrade and downgrade acquirer companies separately in the time period 3 years 
(5 years) before and after the bond rating change.  From Panels A and C in Table 8, we observe 
that before the bond rating change, the upgrade firms acquire targets with lower Tobin’s q and pay 
lower premium compared to downgrade firms, albeit some results are insignificant. And from 
Panels B and D, after the bond rating change, the upgrade firms continue to pay lower premium and 
acquire mostly smaller size target as compared to downgrade firms.  For the most part, however, 
the evidence in Table 8 suggests that there is not much difference in the characteristics of the public 
targets in terms of relative deal size, firm size, Tobin's q and the premium paid in the acquisition.    
 
6.3 Logistic regression analysis  
We next undertake cross-sectional analyses to determine if the types of acquisitions preceding the 
rating change can predict the bond rating revision.  The analysis so far suggests that firms with 
rating upgrades are associated with positive acquisition announcement returns in the years before 
the rating change while those with a rating downgrade have negative abnormal returns around 
acquisition announcements.  We now employ logistic regressions, controlling for other factors 
that affect acquisition motives, to determine the likelihood of a rating upgrade or downgrade.  
 
Before the bond rating change, our samples contain 1,643 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
within 3 years before their bond rating announcements from 1988-2013 and 2,566 acquisitions 
within 5 years before the bond rating change during 1985-2013.  We implement logistic 
regressions by using the variables noted previously to examine whether mergers and acquisition 
activities influence the acquirer firms’ future bond rating change.  The dependent variable is the 
dummy variable which equals to 1 if the acquirer companies have upgrade bond rating change and 
0 otherwise.  The results are displayed in Tables 9 and 10. The key explanation variable is 
acquirers’ announcement-period CAR, which represent the acquirer returns during acquisitions. 
Columns 2 to 6 present the coefficients of independent variables and the dependent variable which 
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equals to 1 if the acquirer companies have upgrade bond rating change and 0 otherwise during the 
event days (-1,0), (0.+1), (-1,+1), (-2,2), (-5,5). 
 
From Table 9, we can conclude that the possibility of firms getting an upgrade rating change is 
positively related to the acquirers’ announcement-period CARs, stock deal, free cash flow, 
operating income growth and stock price run-up.  First, the acquirers’ announcement-period 
CARs are significantly positive related to acquirer firms’ upgrade rating change during each event 
window on 1%-level, which strongly support our hypothesis about bond rating change is a 
response to companies’ past mergers and acquisitions activities (H1). The performance of 
investment activity clearly is a significant determining factor for rating revisions.  Second, the 
control variable stock deal is significantly positively related to acquirer firms’ upgrade rating 
change during each event window on 1%-level, which means firms are more likely to experience 
upgrade rating change by paying for their acquisitions with at least partially by stock.  Since 
private and subsidiary targets make up most of the acquisitions (85.5%) in our sample, the stock 
price influence of stock deals may be less negative or even turn out to be positive if the target is 
private (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002).  New blockholders may be brought into the stock 
acquisitions from the target shareholders, and the bidding firm probably will benefit from these 
positive monitoring actions of their firm management by these blockholders (Chang, 1998).  Third, 
the variables free cash flow and operating income growth are significantly positively related to 
acquirer firms’ upgrade rating change through each event windows on 5%-level, which suggest that 
higher free cash flow is a proxy for better firm performance and higher quality managers tend to 
make better acquisitions.  For the stock price run-up, the coefficients estimated are significantly 
positive during each event window on 1%-level, which indicates that acquirer pre-announcement 
buy-and-hold abnormal return effect acquirer firms’ bond rating upgrade positively and 
significantly. 
 
Also, from Table 9 we determine that the possibility of firms getting upgrade rating change is 
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negatively related to diversifying acquisition, relative deal size and Tobin’s q.  Diversifying 
acquisition is significantly negatively related to firm upgrade rating change during each event 
window on 1%-level, which is consistent with the previous finding about diversifying acquisitions 
generally destroying shareholder value and possibly benefit self-interested managers (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1990).  Relative deal size is significantly negatively related to firm upgrade 
rating change through each event window on 5%-level, though the numbers are small (-0.0003), 
perhaps because of large acquirers (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004).  Firm performance 
variables such as Tobin’ q is significantly negatively related to firm upgrade rating change during 
each event window on 1%-level.  These results reflect that, on average, higher growth firms are 
more likely to pay higher premiums due to agency and hubris (Roll, 1986).  Thus, managers from 
high growth firms are more likely to make the value-reducing acquisitions especially with more 
debts and less free cash flows followed.  
 
Table 10 shows the results for time period from Year -5 to Year 0.  The results overall are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9.  The possibility of firms getting upgrade rating 
change is positively related to the acquirers’ announcement-period CARs, stock deal, operating 
income growth and stock price run-up. Though the free cash flow variable is not statistically 
significant, it is still positively related to likelihood of bond rating upgrades following these 
acquisitions.  Meanwhile, diversifying acquisition, Tobin’s q and leverage are negatively related 
to bond upgrades and are statistically significant.  Leverage is also an essential governance 
mechanism, since higher leverage reduces the future free cash flow and limits managerial 
discretion.  Though the relative deal size turns out to be statistically insignificant, it is still 
negatively related to bond upgrades. 
 
6.4 Analysis of Motives of Acquisitions 
In this section we investigate the rationale behind takeovers and if they are related to acquirer bond 
rating change. We compute the relation between target gain and total gain, and target gain and 
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acquirer gain to distinguish between the three motives: synergy, agency and hubris (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993). Our sample only contain acquisitions where both the acquirer and target firms 
are public. The sample size for this analysis is significantly reduced as most targets in our sample 
are private firms. The results for acquisitions prior to the bond rating change are shown in Table 11 
while the results for acquisitions after the bond rating change are shown in Table 12. 
 
From Panel A in Table 11, we note that target gain is positively related to total gain in the total 
“acquisitions announced by upgrade firms within 5 years before the rating change” sample at the 
1%-level (β=0.0653, p=0.0003) as well as in the positive total gain subsample at the 1%-level 
(β=0.1384, p=0.0004). Meanwhile the estimate of  β  in the negative total gain subsample is 
positive and insignificant. These results strongly support our hypothesis that synergy is the prime 
motive in acquisitions announced by upgrade acquirer firms before the bond rating change, while 
the agency and hubris hypothesis are rejected for this group.  This result is consistent with our 
prior findings about “good” acquisitions, that had a positive abnormal return on the announcement 
date, have a positive effect on rating revisions.  Panel B provides the regressions between target 
and acquirer gain for the same sample as in Panel A.  Target gain and acquirer gain is positively 
correlated in the total sample of “acquisitions announced by upgrade firms within 5 years before 
the rating change” and positive total gain subsample, and negatively correlated in negative total 
gain subsample, though the results are insignificant.  In panel C, target gain is positive and 
insignificantly related to total gain in the total sample of “acquisitions announced by downgrade 
firms within 5 years before the rating change”.  In the subsample of negative total gain, the 
correlation is negative and insignificant, while in the subsample of positive total gain the 
correlation is positive and significant, which implies that synergy is still a motive in positive total 
gain group of acquisitions announced by downgrade acquirer firms before bond rating change, and 
agency is a likely motive in negative total gain group though the result is insignificant.  In panel D, 
target gain is negative and insignificantly related to acquirer gain in the total “acquisitions 
announced by downgrade firms within 5 years before the rating change” sample as well as in 
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positive total gain subsample.  In the negative total subsample, the estimate is negative and 
significant on 5%-level (( β=-0.0373, p=0.0226), which suggests the presence of agency in 
takeovers announced by downgrade firms before the bond rating change. 
 
The results in Table 11 strongly suggest that firms that experience ratings upgrades tend to make 
value-enhancing acquisitions in the years preceding the rating change.  For the downgrade sample, 
both synergy and agency appear to exist as motives.  For the subgroup with positive total gains it is 
synergy while for the subgroup with negative total gains it is agency.   
 
Our earlier analysis suggests that firm with ratings downgrades are more cautious in acquisitions 
after the rating change.  We noted this from the positive abnormal returns for acquisitions by these 
firms in the post rating change period.  We further examine the motives for acquisitions after the 
ratings change using target gain, acquirer gain and total gain.  The results are shown in Table 12.  
From panel A, the correlation between target and total gain is negative and insignificant in sample 
“acquisitions announced by upgrade firms within 5 years after the rating change”. For subsample 
negative total gain, the estimate of  β is -0.0211 (p=0.0264), and for subsample positive total gain, 
the estimate of  β is 0.0423 (p=0.0047). The estimates are significant at 5%-level and 1%-level, 
respectively.  These result suggests that after the bond rating change, for the upgraded rating 
change firms the overall evidence suggests that both synergy and agency are motives, whereas 
prior to the rating change, synergy was the dominant motive.  We do not find evidence for the 
hubris hypothesis in this group.  Panel B shows the correlation between target and acquirer gain is 
negative and significant in subsample negative total gain at 1%-level (β=-0.0269, p=0.0033), while 
the estimate in the subsample of positive total gain it is positive and insignificant, which suggests 
that agency is a motive in this sample.  It thus appears that some of the upgraded firms pursue 
more aggressive and riskier M&A strategies after the rating change.  In panel C, the estimates of 
β are positive and significant in sample “acquisitions announced by downgrade firms within 5 
years after the rating change” (β=0.2010, p=<0.0001), the subsample of negative total gain 
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(β=0.2185, p=<0.0001) and the subsample positive of total gain (β=0.1339, p=0.0038). These 
results strongly suggest that after a bond rating downgrade, synergy is a primary motive for 
takeovers announced by these acquirers. This result is very consistent with our hypothesis that 
downgraded firms make suitable adjustments to their acquisition strategies to prevent a continued 
decline in the firm's financial performance. From panel D, the correlations between target and 
acquirer gain are positive in the sample “acquisitions announced by downgrade firms within 5 
years after the rating change” (β=0.1814, p=<0.0001) and subsample negative total gain (β=0.2348, 
P=<0.0001), both estimates are significant on 1%-level, which again means that synergy is the 
primary motive.  There is no evidence for agency or hubris in this sample for acquisitions made 
after the rating change. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Previous studies have mostly focused on the relation between bond rating change and firms' 
financial performance.  In this study, we examine the impact of acquisitions on the likelihood of a 
positive or a negative rating change and any change in subsequent acquisition strategy.  
 
The abnormal returns for downgrade firms surrounding the bond rating change are significantly 
negative, largely because the downgrade firms either offer significant information to capital 
markets or impose costs on the affected firms.  There is some evidence that upgrade firms show 
positive abnormal returns but otherwise they are not statistically significant. These results are 
largely consistent with the prior literature.  For the upgrade firms with acquisitions announced 
during the pre-rating change period, we observe higher positive abnormal returns than upgrade 
non-acquirer firms, which suggests that investors recognize the improving financial position of 
companies well through acquisitions before rating changes are acknowledged by the market.  On 
the other hand, firms with ratings downgrades that made prior acquisitions experience less negative 
abnormal returns on the announcement of the rating change compared to firms that made no 
acquisitions.  This suggests that some of the information in the rating change announcement is 
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anticipated for this group due to the poor acquisition decisions made by these firms.   
 
We also find significant higher acquirers’ M&A announcement-period CARs for rating upgrades 
before the rating change, which suggest that mergers and acquisitions activities provide 
information to rating agencies and financial market, and firms which announced higher abnormal 
return acquisitions are significantly more likely to get rating upgrades, whereas firms with a rating 
downgrade had abnormal returns around acquisitions that were either negative or statistically not 
significant.  Meanwhile, higher free cash flow and stock price run-up, better management quality, 
lower Tobin’s q and lower leverage, acquisitions that are non-diversifying and with smaller relative 
deal size and financed by at least partially with stock have a positive influence on rating revision.  
 
Rating upgrades are preceded mainly by synergy motivated acquisitions while both synergy and 
agency appear to be motives for these firms subsequent to the rating upgrade.  Rating downgrades, 
on the other hand, are preceded by acquisitions that have synergy and agency as motives.  
However, in subsequent years, the downgrade firms appear to apply remedial measures on their 
long-term investment activities.  They make fewer but value-increasing acquisitions which reduce 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Abnormal return and bond rating change 
CAR(-1,0) 2-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by the market model which 
is estimated over the time period (-210,-11) with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as market index. 
CAR(0,+1) 2-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by the market model which 
is estimated over the time period (-210,-11) with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as market index. 
CAR(-1,+1) 3-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by the market model which 
is estimated over the time period (-210,-11) with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as market index. 
CAR(-2,+2) 5-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by the market model which 
is estimated over the time period (-210,-11) with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as market index. 
CAR(-5,+5) 11-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by the market model which 
is estimated over the time period (-210,-11) with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as market index. 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Public target Dummy variable: 1 if public target firms, 0 otherwise. 
Private target Dummy variable: 1 if private target firms, 0 otherwise. 
Subsidiary target Dummy variable: 1 if subsidiary private firms, 0 otherwise. 
Diversifying acquisition Dummy variable: 1 for bidder and target do not both from a Fama-French 
industry, 0 otherwise. 
High tech Dummy variable: 1 if both bidder and target are from high tech industries, 
0 otherwise. 
Relative deal size Deal value (SDC) divided by bidder market value of equity. 
All-cash deal Dummy variable: 1 if it’s pure cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Stock deal Dummy variable: 1 if it’s at least partially stock-financed deals, 0 
otherwise. 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Firm size Log of book value of the total assets 
Market value of equity Number of shares outstanding multiplies the stock price in the end of 11 
trading day before announcement date. 
Free cash flow (Operating Income before Depreciation–Interest and Related 
Expense–Income Taxes–Capital Expenditures)/the book value of total 
assets 
Tobin's q (Book value of assets–Book value of equity+Market value of equity)/Book 
value of assets 
Leverage (Short-term debt+ Long-term debt)/(Book value of assets–Book value of 
equity+ Market value of equity) 
Operating income growth (EBITDAt-1 – EBITDAt-4)/EBITDAt-4 
Stock price runup Acquirer's buy-and-hold abnormal return in the period (-210,-11) with the 
CRSP value-weighted return. 
Premium 1 week prior to 
announcement 
Offer price/Target’s stock price 1 week before the merger public 
announcement date 
Premium 4 week prior to 
announcement 





Table 1. Bond Rating Change Distribution by Announcement Year 
This data consists of 2092 announcements of U.S. bond rating changes during 1990 to 2012 
(listed on Moody’s), which include 875 rating upgrades and 1217 rating downgrades. This 
sample includes those observations when a single bond rating change occurred within 3 years 
for each company.  















1990 80 3.82% 20 60 
1991 46 2.20% 18 28 
1992 31 1.48% 17 14 
1993 52 2.49% 26 26 
1994 66 3.16% 39 27 
1995 66 3.16% 31 35 
1996 83 3.97% 57 26 
1997 66 3.16% 32 34 
1998 86 4.11% 32 54 
1999 86 4.11% 30 56 
2000 98 4.69% 30 68 
2001 78 3.73% 14 64 
2002 202 9.66% 34 168 
2003 146 6.98% 47 99 
2004 117 5.59% 60 57 
2005 84 4.02% 41 43 
2006 86 4.11% 51 35 
2007 104 4.97% 50 54 
2008 118 5.64% 28 90 
2009 93 4.44% 28 65 
2010 99 4.73% 71 28 
2011 84 4.02% 51 33 
2012 121 5.78% 68 53 
















Table 2. Summary Distribution of Acquisitions Announced within 3 years before and 
after the Bond Rating Change 
This sample concludes 4408 mergers and acquisitions announced by bond rating change 
companies within 3 years before and after the bond rating change from 1987 to 2013. There are 
1028 mergers and acquisitions announced by upgrade rating change companies and 1395 
mergers and acquisitions announced by downgrade rating change companies within 3 years 
before the bond rating change. Meanwhile, 1290 mergers and acquisitions announced by 
upgrade rating change companies and 695 mergers and acquisitions announced by downgrade 
rating change companies within 3 years after the bond rating change.  
 
3 Years before 3 Years after 
Year UPG DNG UPG DNG 
1987 3 3 
  1988 11 21 
  1989 16 22 
  1990 19 32 
 
3 
1991 33 15 7 10 
1992 22 24 17 20 
1993 52 27 25 22 
1994 54 28 49 27 
1995 73 38 49 18 
1996 75 94 81 27 
1997 82 145 106 33 
1998 49 134 131 41 
1999 58 152 88 42 
2000 48 137 76 35 
2001 41 115 40 53 
2002 57 62 30 46 
2003 40 52 51 48 
2004 47 45 73 56 
2005 39 40 66 37 
2006 27 71 58 31 
2007 45 57 78 24 
2008 31 30 44 17 
2009 30 12 20 13 
2010 41 16 38 23 
2011 26 18 42 32 











Table 3. Summary Distribution of Acquisitions Announced within 5 years before and 
after the Bond Rating Change 
This sample consists total 6794 mergers and acquisitions made by bond rating change 
companies 5 years before and after the bond rating change listed on SDC between 1985 and 
2013. There are 1616 mergers and acquisitions announced by upgrade rating change companies 
and 2260 mergers and acquisitions announced by downgrade rating change companies within 5 
years before the bond rating change. Meanwhile, 1770 mergers and acquisitions announced by 
upgrade rating change companies and 1148 mergers and acquisitions announced by downgrade 
rating change companies within 5 years after the bond rating change.  
 
5 Years before 5 Years after 




  1986 8 26 
  1987 13 16 
  1988 19 35 
  1989 30 35 
  1990 29 47 
 
3 
1991 56 28 7 10 
1992 44 35 17 20 
1993 85 40 27 27 
1994 93 59 58 40 
1995 93 102 59 34 
1996 103 154 100 41 
1997 115 237 125 59 
1998 95 280 159 51 
1999 100 254 130 60 
2000 80 190 112 48 
2001 62 136 81 65 
2002 79 84 54 74 
2003 59 77 79 82 
2004 57 94 91 75 
2005 61 77 79 79 
2006 75 81 94 86 
2007 95 79 111 71 
2008 56 38 70 40 
2009 33 14 40 21 
2010 41 16 61 31 
2011 26 18 65 42 









Table 4. Event Study Results for Bond Rating Change Announcement Date 
This table presents the event study results for the cumulative abnormal return around bond rating change 
announcement day by market model and market adjusted model, separately. Day 0 is the bond rating change 
announcement day. The event windows include 2-day, 3-day, 5-day, 11-day and 21-day. The numbers of patell 
Z-test are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
All rating changes M&A announced before 
rating changes 
No M&A announced 
before rating changes 
Panel A: Value weighted by market model 
Days relative to 
the event day UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG 
(-1,0) 0.12% -1.06%*** 0.17%* -0.75%*** 0.00% -1.77%*** 
 
(1.155) (-8.069)  (1.320)  (-5.653)   (0.118) (-6.078)  
(0,1) 0.15%* -1.37%*** 0.18% -1.25%*** 0.08% -1.64%*** 
 
(1.474) (-10.349) (1.114) (-9.180) (0.981) (-4.883) 
(-1,1) 0.10% -1.70%*** 0.17% -1.41%*** -0.04% -2.37%*** 
 
(1.01) (-10.056) (1.131) (-7.945) (0.136) (-6.216) 
(-2,2) 0.06% -2.19%*** 0.15% -1.98%*** -0.12% -2.67%*** 
 
(0.846) (-9.923)  (0.992) (-7.802) (0.049) (-6.190)  
(-5,5) -0.30% -2.31%*** -0.59%* -2.08%*** 0.34% -2.84%*** 
 
(-0.416) (-7.304)  (-1.302)  (-5.638) (1.164) (-4.715) 
Number of obs. 750 914 511 636 239 278 
Panel B: Value weighted by market adjusted returns 
Days relative to 
the event day UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG 
(-1,0) 0.30%*** -1.23%*** 0.38%*** -0.94%*** 0.13% -1.91%*** 
 
(2.414) (-8.985) (2.464) (-6.538) (0.675) (-6.399) 
(0,1) 0.30%*** -1.56%*** 0.31%** -1.43%*** 0.27%** -1.87%*** 
 
(2.532) (-11.373)  (1.900) (-9.909) (1.706)  (-5.636) 
(-1,1) 0.35%*** -1.98%*** 0.43%*** -1.67%*** 0.18% -2.69%*** 
 
(2.513) (-11.226) (2.423) (-8.859) (0.91) (-6.954) 
(-2,2) 0.57%*** -2.70%*** 0.67%*** -2.45%*** 0.37% -3.27%*** 
 
(3.143) (-11.781) (2.953) (-9.267) (0.961) (-7.343) 
(-5,5) 0.91%*** -3.49%*** 0.69%** -3.21%*** 1.37%*** -4.13%*** 
 
(3.243) (-10.492) (2.001)  (-8.313) (2.817) (-6.450) 
Number of obs. 750 914 511 636 239 278 
***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively, using a 









Table 5. Comparison of Bond Rating Firm with and without M&As 
This table presents t statistics results for two following groups, “upgrade companies with M&A announcements and 
without M&A announcements before bond rating announcement” and “downgrade companies with M&A 
announcements and without M&A announcements before bond rating announcement”, the results are presented by using 





Panel A: Value weighted by market model 
Days relative to the 
event day M&A no M&A T stat P-value M&A no M&A T stat P-value 




















  (-5,5) -0.59%* 0.34% -1.4769 0.1403 -2.08%*** -2.84%*** 1.9029* 0.0575 
 
(-1.302)  (1.164) 
  
(-5.638) (-4.715) 
  Number of obs. 511 239 
  
636 278 
  Panel B: Value weighted by market adjusted returns 
Days relative to the 
event day M&A no M&A T stat P-value M&A no M&A T stat P-value 

























  Number of obs. 511 239 
  
636 278 
  ***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively, using a generic 









Table 6. Event Study Results for Mergers and Acquisitions Announcement Date 
This table shows the event study results for the cumulative abnormal return around mergers and acquisitions 
announcement day by market model and market adjusted model, separately. Day 0 is the mergers and acquisitions 
announcement day. The event windows include 2-day, 3-day, 5-day, 11-day and 21-day. The numbers of patell Z-test are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
 
3 Years before 3 Years after 5 Years before 5 Years after 
Panel A: Value weighted by market model 
Days relative to the 
event day UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG 
(-1,0) 0.50%*** -0.22%*** 0.19%** 0.13% 0.54%*** -0.10%*** 0.16%*** 0.07% 
 
(4.551) (-2.944) (2.239) (0.374) (5.462) (-2.581) (2.919) (0.361) 
(0,1) 0.81%*** 0.23%* 0.45%*** 0.81%*** 0.92%*** 0.33%*** 0.42%*** 0.63%*** 
 
(7.527) (1.287) (5.015) (4.251) (9.750) (2.927) (5.652) (4.976) 
(-1,1) 0.82%*** 0.09% 0.35%*** 0.57%*** 0.93%*** 0.22% 0.35%*** 0.44%*** 
 
(6.284) (-0.383) (3.214) (2.407) (8.067) (0.769) (4.127) (2.746) 
(-2,2) 0.62%*** -0.19%** 0.33%*** 0.69%** 0.87%*** 0.05% 0.36%*** 0.46%** 
 
(4.086) (-1.964) (2.561) (2.134) (6.261) (-0.651) (3.539) (2.143) 
(-5,5) 0.64%*** -0.66%*** 0.22% 0.74%** 0.79%*** -0.36%*** 0.31%* 0.53%*** 
 
(2.879) (-3.506) (0.632) (2.322) (4.031) (-2.942) (1.593) (2.466) 
Number of obs. 993 1337 1274 676 1564 2143 1750 1107 
Panel B: Value weighted by market adjusted returns 
Days relative to the 
event day UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG UPG DNG 
(-1,0) 0.69%*** -0.09%** 0.33%*** 0.14% 0.72%*** 0.01%* 0.31%*** 0.12% 
 
(6.025) (-1.986) (3.773) (0.325) (7.163) (-1.519) (4.688) (0.673) 
(0,1) 1.01%*** 0.32%** 0.56%*** 0.92%*** 1.10%*** 0.41%*** 0.54%*** 0.73%*** 
 
(9.024) (2.009) (6.021) (4.711) (11.425) (3.698) (7.021) (5.559) 
(-1,1) 1.10%*** 0.25% 0.53%*** 0.65%*** 1.19%*** 0.35%** 0.53%*** 0.54%*** 
 
(8.063) (0.552) (4.696) (2.612) (10.091) (1.762) (5.910) (3.259) 
(-2,2) 1.09%*** 0.01% 0.63%*** 0.88%*** 1.29%*** 0.26% 0.66%*** 0.67%*** 
 
(6.396) (-0.934) (4.588) (2.730) (8.820) (0.693) (5.940) (3.122) 
(-5,5) 1.67%*** -0.15%** 0.83%*** 1.27%*** 1.69%*** 0.16% 0.90%*** 1.06%*** 
 
(6.325) (-1.781) (3.477) (3.508) (7.734) (-0.707) (4.828) (4.193) 
Number of obs. 993 1337 1274 676 1564 2143 1750 1107 
***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively, using a generic 










Table 7. Comparison of Variables for Acquirer Firms within 3 Years before and 5 Years before the 
Bond Rating Change 
This sample concludes 1463 mergers and acquisitions announced by bond rating change companies within 3 
years before and 2566 announced within 5 years before the bond rating change from 1985 to 2013. The table 
displays the estimate of the mean of variables of the upgrade and downgrade bond rating change acquirer 




UPG DNG T Stat P-value 
Panel A. Acquirer companies within 3 years before the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.0901 0.1291 1.54 0.1241 
(0.3053) (0.6269) 
  Firm size 3.4851 3.4533 -1.03 0.3018 
(0.6309) (0.6106) 
  Free cash flow 0.0176 0.0109 -1.27 0.2058 
(0.1203) (0.0951) 
  Tobin's q 1.5079 1.6044 2.61*** 0.0091 
(0.5975) (0.8423) 
  Leverage 0.0819 0.0891 1.27 0.2031 
(0.1115) (0.1131) 
  Operating income growth 1.3186 1.0686 -1.32 0.1863 
(4.2730) (3.3895) 
  Stock price runup -0.0529 -0.1732 -3.70*** 0.0002 
(0.6831) (0.6321) 
  Number of obs. 724 919 
  Panel B. Acquirer companies within 5 years before the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.1057 0.1129 0.38 0.7073 
 (0.4046) (0.5316)   
Firm size 3.4480 3.4395 -0.35 0.7265 
 (0.6263) (0.5908)   
Free cash flow 0.0169 0.0160 -0.22 0.8290 
 (0.1105) (0.1012)   
Tobin's q 1.5167 1.5945 2.70*** 0.0070 
 (0.6152) (0.7990)   
Leverage 0.0838 0.0937 2.17** 0.0302 
 (0.1113) (0.1173)   
Operating income growth 1.3325 1.0820 -1.80* 0.0716 
 (4.0445) (2.9933)   
Stock price runup -0.0503 -0.1744 -4.13*** <.0001 
 (0.6665) (0.8160)   
Number of obs. 1116 1450   






Table 8. Comparison of Variables for Target Firms 
This table shows the evaluation of the mean of variables of the public target companies acquired by upgrade rating 
companies and downgrade rating companies within 3 years(Panel A and Panel B) and 5 years(Panel C and Panel D) 
before and after the announcement of bond rating change during 1985-2013, standard deviation are shown in 
parentheses.  
  UPG DNG T Stat P-value 
Panel A. Target companies within 3 years before the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.4411 0.8103 1.57 0.1186 
(0.7361) (1.7639) 
  Firm size 2.6769 2.5967 -0.71 0.4811 
(0.6628) (0.6948) 
  Tobin's q 1.5137 1.8257 1.74* 0.0836 
(0.7613) (1.2645) 
  Premium 1 week prior to 
announcement 
30.7677 37.9522 1.60 0.1112 
(27.6382) (26.2657) 
  
Premium 4 week prior to 
announcement 
37.6619 44.2987 1.08 0.2810 
(35.8543) (37.4701) 
  
Number of obs. 64 82 
  Panel B. Target companies within 3 years after the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.5218 0.4976 -0.10 0.9173 
(1.4561) (0.7659) 
  Firm size 2.6512 2.9011 1.84* 0.0674 
(0.7597) (0.6891) 
  Tobin's q 1.7252 1.4589 -1.21 0.2270 
(1.4265) (0.4846) 
  Premium 1 week prior to 
announcement 
37.7365 47.1004 1.20 0.2342 
(40.5922) (46.1907) 
  
Premium 4 week prior to 
announcement 
39.5444 62.8509 2.24** 0.0269 
(42.1316) (77.2239) 
  Number of obs. 86 45    
Panel C. Target companies within 5 years before the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.5514 0.6647 0.63 0.5272 
(0.9668) (1.5052) 
  Firm size 2.6439 2.4963 -1.52 0.1304 
(0.6825) (0.7298) 
  Tobin's q 1.6625 1.9100 1.34 0.1818 
(1.0860) (1.5119) 
  Premium 1 week prior to 
announcement 
29.6141 36.6435 1.78* 0.0764 
(27.2154) (29.9552) 
  
Premium 4 week prior to 
announcement 
36.9399 41.2499 0.87 0.3864 
(34.9058) (37.2223) 
  
Number of obs. 92 127 
  Panel D. Target companies within 5 years after the bond rating change 
Relative deal size 0.5070 0.4405 -0.39 0.6947 
(1.2861) (0.7449) 
  Firm size 2.6849 2.9074 1.86* 0.0639 
(0.7895) (0.7871) 
  Tobin's q 1.6827 1.4838 -1.22 0.2223 
(1.2585) (0.6370) 
  Premium 1 week prior to 
announcement 
37.5278 39.5861 0.34 0.7325 
(37.6956) (43.0598) 
  
Premium 4 week prior to 
announcement 
40.9434 50.4449 1.22 0.2222 
(39.4315) (67.0086) 
  
Number of obs. 119 69 
  ***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 9. Logistic Regression Analysis for Acquirer Companies within 3 years before Bond Rating Change 
This sample consists of 1643 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions made by acquirer companies within 3 years before 
their bond rating change from SDC during 1987-2013. The dependent variable is the dummy variable which equals to 1 when 
the acquirer companies have upgrade bond rating change and 0 otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix.  
 
Variables:           
Days relative to the event day -1 to 0 0 to +1 -1 to +1 -2 to +2 -5 to +5 
CAR 4.6570*** 3.4522*** 3.3422*** 2.4294*** 1.5932*** 
(0.0002) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0032) (0.0063) 
Deal Characteristics: 
     Public target -0.2790 -0.2966 -0.2995 -0.2994 -0.2996 
(0.5168) (0.4913) (0.4868) (0.4872) (0.4863) 
Private target -0.0175 -0.0257 -0.0220 -0.0189 -0.0157 
(0.9655) (0.9493) (0.9566) (0.9627) (0.9689) 
Subsidiary target -0.0149 -0.0276 -0.0224 -0.0189 -0.0129 
(0.9706) (0.9456) (0.9558) (0.9627) (0.9746) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.3865*** -0.3844*** -0.3887*** -0.3871*** -0.3887*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
High tech -0.0551 -0.0493 -0.0477 -0.0519 -0.0534 
(0.6715) (0.7036) (0.7129) (0.6890) (0.6803) 
Relative deal size -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003** 
(0.0473) (0.0694) (0.0618) (0.0569) (0.0488) 
All-cash deal 0.0674 0.0523 0.0570 0.0565 0.0623 
(0.5765) (0.6644) (0.6365) (0.6393) (0.6051) 
Stock deal 0.5218*** 0.5256*** 0.5279*** 0.5332*** 0.5319*** 
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Acquirer Characteristics: 
     Firm size 0.1324 0.1213 0.1318 0.1170 0.1105 
(0.1357) (0.1713) (0.1383) (0.1857) (0.2107) 
Free cash flow 1.2459** 1.2089** 1.2181** 1.2475** 1.2143** 
(0.0229) (0.0274) (0.0264) (0.0232) (0.0262) 
Tobin's q -0.3048*** -0.3056*** -0.3071*** -0.3028*** -0.2887*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
Leverage -0.6837 -0.7096 -0.7180 -0.7449 -0.7583 
(0.1633) (0.1472) (0.1423) (0.1278) (0.1213) 
Operating income growth 0.0296** 0.0288** 0.0287** 0.0285** 0.0291** 
(0.0403) (0.0466) (0.0476) (0.0487) (0.0437) 
Stock price runup 0.3186*** 0.3199*** 0.3194*** 0.3137*** 0.3209*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Number of obs. 1643 1643 1643 1643 1643 
***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 10. Logistic Regression Analysis for Acquirer Companies within 5 years before Bond Rating Change 
This sample consists of 2566 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions made by acquirer companies within 5 years before 
their bond rating change from SDC during 1985-2013. The dependent variable is the dummy variable which equals to 1 when 
the acquirer companies have upgrade bond rating change and 0 otherwise. P-values are shown in parentheses. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix.   
 
Variables:           
Days relative to the event day -1 to 0 0 to +1 -1 to +1 -2 to +2 -5 to +5 
CAR 3.7015*** 2.7453*** 2.6839*** 2.0771*** 1.2287*** 
(0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0070) 
Deal Characteristics: 
     Public target -0.3323 -0.3437 -0.3442 -0.3335 -0.3453 
(0.3285) (0.3117) (0.3115) (0.3270) (0.3092) 
Private target -0.2486 -0.2565 -0.2534 -0.2424 -0.2485 
(0.4374) (0.4225) (0.4287) (0.4490) (0.4366) 
Subsidiary target -0.1958 -0.2109 -0.2046 -0.1936 -0.1994 
(0.5409) (0.5097) (0.5229) (0.5455) (0.5326) 
Diversifying acquisition -0.2180*** -0.2140*** -0.2167*** -0.2167*** -0.2166*** 
(0.0085) (0.0098) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
High tech 0.0840 0.0891 0.0893 0.0854 0.0877 
(0.4227) (0.3947) (0.3934) (0.4150) (0.4021) 
Relative deal size -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.3752) (0.4108) (0.3840) (0.3627) (0.3309) 
All-cash deal 0.0191 0.0187 0.0166 0.0129 0.0178 
(0.8407) (0.8440) (0.8615) (0.8925) (0.8516) 
Stock deal 0.3653*** 0.3767*** 0.3752*** 0.3742*** 0.3694*** 
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
Acquirer Characteristics: 
     Firm size 0.0381 0.0274 0.0356 0.0264 0.0205 
(0.5963) (0.7022) (0.6207) (0.7123) (0.7745) 
Free cash flow 0.5703 0.5597 0.5559 0.5389 0.5148 
(0.1713) (0.1789) (0.1821) (0.1978) (0.2196) 
Tobin's q -0.2694*** -0.2705*** -0.2709*** -0.2668*** -0.2606*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Leverage -1.0400*** -1.0176*** -1.0359*** -1.0327*** -1.0522*** 
(0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0059) 
Operating income growth 0.0288** 0.0280** 0.0280** 0.0276** 0.0281** 
(0.0181) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0237) (0.0214) 
Stock price runup 0.2828*** 0.2851*** 0.2842*** 0.2850*** 0.2921*** 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Number of obs. 2566 2566 2566 2566 2566 
***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 11. Relation between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gain in Acquisitions Announced within 5 years 
before Bond Rating Change 
Target gain is regressed against total gain in Panel A among “acquisitions announced by upgrade bond rating change 
companies within 5 years before the rating change” subsample and in Panel C among “acquisitions announced by downgrade 
bond rating change companies within 5 years before the rating change” subsample, meanwhile target gain is regressed 
against acquirer gain in Panel B among “acquisitions announced by upgrade bond rating change companies within 5 years 
before the rating change” subsample and in Panel D among “acquisitions announced by downgrade bond rating change 
companies within 5 years before the rating change” subsample during 1990-2012. Target gain is calculated by a variable 
window beginning five days before the announcement date of completed mergers and acquisitions and ending five days after. 
Acquirer gain is calculated by a window beginning five days before the announcement date of completed mergers and 
acquisitions by that acquirer and ending five days after. Total gain is the sum of target gain and acquirer gain. Coefficients are 
estimated for the whole sample and the subsample of negative total gains and positive total gains in each panel, and 
t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Sample Size 𝜶 𝜷 P-value 
Panel A. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Total gain)  

























Panel B. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Acquirer gain)  





















































Panel D. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Acquirer gain)  


























***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table 12. Relation between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gain in Acquisitions Announced within 5 years 
after Bond Rating Change 
Target gain is regressed against total gain in Panel A among “acquisitions announced by upgrade bond rating change 
companies within 5 years after the rating change” subsample and in Panel C among “acquisitions announced by 
downgrade bond rating change companies within 5 years after the rating change” subsample, meanwhile target gain is 
regressed against acquirer gain in Panel B among “acquisitions announced by upgrade bond rating change companies 
within 5 years after the rating change” subsample and in Panel D among “acquisitions announced by downgrade bond 
rating change companies within 5 years after the rating change” subsample during 1990-2012. Target gain is calculated 
from a variable window beginning five days before the announcement date of completed mergers and acquisitions and 
ending five days after. Acquirer gain is calculated from a window beginning five days before the announcement date of 
completed mergers and acquisitions by this acquirer and ending five days after. Total gain is the sum of target gain and 
acquirer gain. Coefficients are estimated for the whole sample and the subsample of negative total gains and positive total 
gains in each panel, and t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Sample Size 𝜶 𝜷 P-value 
Panel A. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Total gain)  



















  0.0423*** 
(2.91) 
0.0047 
Panel B. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Acquirer gain)  























Panel C. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Total gain) 
Total sample 110 113.4078 
(3.36) 
 

















   0.1339*** 
(3.01) 
0.0038 
Panel D. Target gain = 𝜶 + 𝜷(Acquirer gain) 
Total sample 110 131.9588 
(3.20) 
 




















***, **and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively. 
